ABSTRACT In a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) system, the decryption keys are only related to attributes shared by multiple users and do not contain any identity information of their original holders. Hence, if a decryption key is leaked, there is no feasible method to trace the suspicious user. The user tracing problem has become an obstacle to the adoption of CP-ABE in practice. In order to address it, some traceable/accountable CP-ABE schemes have been established. However, considering the user tracing problem in multi-domain environment will face new challenges. Multi-domain environments usually have a two-layer structure, domains and intradomain users. When tracing a user, we should first trace the domain where the user is located, and then trace the user in the domain. Unfortunately, the existing traceable CP-ABE schemes only focus on one level of users tracing, and are not suitable for the two-layer structure of multi-domain environments. Therefore, a white-box traceable CP-ABE scheme in multi-domain environment is proposed in this paper. The proposed scheme obtains a so-called two-layer tracing. At the domain level, a short signature technique is used to prevent an attacker from forging the tracing parameter and realize the traceability for domains. Linkable ring signature technology is introduced at the user level to provide a tracing method for users by utilizing the linkability of the signature. The two signature structures are reasonably embedded in a user private key to support two-layer white-box tracing at both domains and intradomain users. The proposed scheme supports any monotone access structures and has full security against chosen plaintext attack in the standard model. Compared with related schemes, the asymptotic communication cost and the asymptotic computation cost of the proposed scheme are relatively low. These advantages make the proposed scheme more practical for solving the user tracing problem in multi-domain environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of cloud technology, more and more enterprises, organizations, and project teams tend to outsource data to the cloud, which facilitates the data sharing among users. However, cloud service providers may not be fully trusted and the access rights of users are different, thus it is necessary to encrypt outsourced data with flexible access policy. As an
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important variant of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [1] , ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [2] supports one-to-many encryption and fine-grained access control, such that it is a promising data sharing mechanism in cloud environments. Despite the benefits of CP-ABE, there are also new challenges along with its adoption in specific scenarios, such as the multi-domain environment. Multi-domain models are common in our lives, ranging from large enterprises to small project teams. Therefore, employing the CP-ABE technology to realize a multi-domain data sharing system is great meaningful. In order to achieve the goal, the characteristics of multi-domain models and the potential security challenges should be carefully considered.
A Motivating Story: A collaborative software development project team can be served as a concrete instance of the multi-domain environment. Suppose it consists of four working groups: requirement analysis group, architecture design group, programming implementation group, and system debugging group. In terms of the division of labor, members of the same working group should have the same privilege. Specifically, members of the architecture design group should have access to the customer requirement book of the requirements analysis group, members of the programming group should have access to the software flow chart of the architecture design group, and members of the debugging group should have access to the functional modules implemented by the programming group. Conventional CP-ABE schemes can implement data sharing among working groups, but the decryption key generation of them bases on the attributes of each individual user. Intuitively, in this scenario, if the authority of a CP-ABE system can issue decryption keys according to the attributes possessed by working groups rather than individual users, both the workload of the authority and the scale of the attributes in the system will be greatly reduced. For example, suppose Bob and Tom are two members of the architecture design group. Bob has an attribute set S Bob as ''{Bob, male, 37 (age), New York (address), Senior Architect}'' and Tom has an attribute set S Tom as ''{Tom, male, 30 (age), New York (address), Intermediate Architect}''. The architecture design group has an attribute set S ADG as ''{architecture design, Apr-Jul}'', where the two elements represent the work task and period respectively. In the process of the software development, S ADG is enough for Bob and Tom to gain the corresponding privileges (if we do not care their professional titles). And S ADG is smaller than both S Bob and S Tom . Therefore, using the working group attributes instead of the member attributes can improve the efficiency of the software development project team.
In fact, the above scenario reflects a multi-domain environment with two-layer structure, i.e., domains and intradomain users. The software development project team contains multiple working groups (equivalent to domains), and each working group contains multiple members (equivalent to intradomain users). Hierarchical attribute-based encryption (HABE) [3] - [5] may be a good option for the multi-domain environment. Typical HABE schemes organize the system into a tree structure. The root authority manages domain authorities, and the domain authority manages either lower-level domain authorities or users. It runs key delegation layer by layer from top to bottom, such that a user can obtain a decryption key directly from his domain authority and the case that all users apply for decryption keys from the root authority can be avoided. In a word, the key delegation between layers is an important idea to implement the hierarchical structure in HABE.
HABE can help us realize a hierarchical architecture, such as a high-depth tree. But it may be too complex for the two-layer multi-domain models. In addition, HABE just manages the user attribute universe in a hierarchical way, and does not really decrease the size of the attribute universe in the system. In other words, HABE still handle the user attributes, and does not consider the concept of the domain attributes. Therefore, maybe we can skip HABE and try another simple way to construct the CP-ABE scheme adjusting to the multi-domain environment. To be specific, we replace user attributes with domain attributes. In this way, each domain obtains a domain private key from the authority based on the domain attributes it owns, and users in the same domain can share the same domain private key. Nevertheless, when a domain private key is leaked, the problem of undetermined malicious users will arise. In order to trace malicious users, it is still necessary for each user to have his own unique user private key. Thus, we reconsider the key delegation between layers idea of HABE, and then let the user private key be derived from the domain private key. With the above simple way rather than HABE, a two-layer CP-ABE scheme which adapts to the multi-domain environment will be available.
Unfortunately, even if each user has a unique private key, we will still suffer from the user tracing problem. As the user private keys defined in a traditional CP-ABE system do not include any individual information of their original owner and they are only associated with attributes shared by multiple users, if a user private key is leaked, there is no feasible approach to trace the malicious user. Moreover, the revocation mechanism cannot address the user tracing problem in CP-ABE. In traditional public key encryption, public key infrastructure (PKI) can revoke users' secret keys based on certificates since certificates are related to users' identities. However, in CP-ABE, a leaked key may point to multiple suspicious users (as above mentioned) and there is no something like a certificate that can reveal a user's identity. Before revoking the leaked key, solving the user tracing problem, i.e., tracing the real malicious user from these suspicious, is still necessary. In response to the user tracing problem, some traceable/accountable CP-ABE schemes have been proposed. However, these schemes are unsuitable for the multi-domain environment. Because of the two-layer structure of the multi-domain environment, an appropriate user tracing method should first trace the domain where the user is located, and then trace the user in the domain. As far as we know, the existing traceable CP-ABE schemes only focus on single layer of user tracing and do not satisfy the above demand. Inspired by the absence of the traceable CP-ABE schemes which adapt to the multi-domain environment, this work is committed to establishing a CP-ABE scheme with two-layer traceability, meaning that the expected scheme can trace both domains and intradomain users.
A. RELATED WORK
Since attributes are used as decryption privileges in CP-ABE, and different users may have the same attributes, how VOLUME 7, 2019 to trace misbehaving users who really leak their decryption privileges is an open problem in CP-ABE. The schemes of [6] and [7] are the early research works of tracing problem in CP-ABE. These schemes only support a single AND gate with wildcard, which limits the expressiveness of access policy. Based on both an CP-ABE scheme [8] and a short signature scheme [9] , Liu et al. proposed a white-box traceable CP-ABE scheme supporting any monotone access structures [10] . The scheme is argued as efficient and fully secure as the scheme of [8] . However, their scheme needs to maintain a tracing table so that the storage overhead for tracing increases linearly with the number of users. Liu et al. also classified the traceability in ABE into two categories, namely white-box traceability and black-box traceability [11] , [12] . In the white-box tracing, taking a well-formed decryption key as input, a tracing algorithm outputs the original key holder. In the black-box tracing, through testing a decryption black-box or device, whereas the decryption keys and even the decryption algorithm keep hidden, a tracing algorithm can still detect the users whose decryption keys have been involved in creating the black-box or device [13] . In this paper, we only focus on the white-box tracing.
Ning et al. proposed a white-box traceable CP-ABE scheme [14] , [15] , supporting the large universe. The tracing method of [14] and [15] is similar as that of [10] . The difference between them is that Ning et al. adopted the Shamir's t,n threshold scheme to eliminate the tracing table of [10] , so that the storage overhead for traitor tracing is constant in [14] and [15] . Li et al. [7] , Zhou et al. [16] and Zhang et al. [17] contribute to the research on multiauthority traceable CP-ABE schemes. The tracing method of [17] is similar as that of the extended scheme of [10] , i.e., they directly embedded the user identity into the user private key. Nevertheless, this strategy may not be adjusted to some scenarios with privacy protection requirements. Jiang et al. constructed an CP-ABE scheme against user private key delegation abuse (i.e., resisting the subset derivation from the original user attribute set), and developed it to a traceable CP-ABE scheme [18] . However, their scheme only supports an AND gate access structure, and the size of ciphertext and user private key grows linearly with the size of the entire attribute universe, which makes the scheme inefficient. In addition, Ning et al. proposed a traceable CP-ABE scheme realizing the public auditing [19] , Guan et al.'s CP-ABE scheme achieved both traceability and reliable key delegation [20] , and Li et al. established a traceable CP-ABE scheme with the verifiable outsourced decryption [21] .
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In multi-domain environment, an ideal tracing fashion is to first detect which domain the leaked user private key comes from, narrowing the scope of tracing, and then identify which user in this domain is its original owner. In other words, not only the domain level can be traced, but also the user level can be traced, achieving the so-called two-layer tracing. To the best of our knowledge, the existing traceable CP-ABE schemes only focus on one level of users tracing, but do not meet the requirement of the two-layer tracing. Therefore, the main work of this paper is to construct a white-box traceable CP-ABE scheme supporting two-layer tracing in multi-domain environment.
Our traceable CP-ABE scheme is established basing on the scheme of [8] , so that it acquires the same good properties, i.e., supporting any monotone access structures and full security against chosen plaintext attack in the standard model. What's more, our scheme develops some new features for the multi-domain environment. Specifically, the innovations of this work are as follows: 1) We replace user attributes with domain attributes. The authority first generates domain private keys according to domain attributes, and then derives user private keys from the domain private keys without introducing new attributes. Consequently, the scale of the attributes in the system can be reduced and the pressure of the authority on managing attributes can be dropped accordingly. 2) We obtain the two-layer white-box tracing by embedding two kinds of tracing structures into the user private key. Layer one is the domain tracing, by which, the authority traces domains using the tracing method of [10] . Layer two is the user tracing, by which, the domain traces its intradomain users using the linkability of linkable ring signature of [22] . The two-layer tracing style relieves the tracing workload of the authority and is more suitable for the multi-domain environment. 3) We also achieve an additional feature: Since the anonymity of the linkable ring signature, a user can keep anonymous to the authority when he applies for a user private key, vs., the authority can verify a user's validity without compromising his anonymity.
C. OUTLINE
Section II reviews the background, including the bilinear map, the assumptions, and the linkable ring signature. Section III gives the formal definition of our scheme and its security model. Section IV presents the construction of our scheme. Section V gives the security proof and the traceability proof. Section VI analyzes the performance and features of our scheme with related traceable CP-ABE schemes. Finally, Section VII presents a brief conclusion and our future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. COMPOSITE ORDER BILINEAR GROUPS
Assume G is a group generation algorithm with a security parameter κ as input and outputs (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , G, G T , e). p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes, G and G T are cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , and e : G × G → G T is a map such that:
2) (Non-Degenerate) ∃g ∈ G such that e (g, g) has order N in G T . The group operations in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are computable in polynomial time.
The three assumptions in composite order bilinear groups below follow the descriptions in [8] and [10] , here we omit the details except the Assumption 2.
Assumption 1 (Subgroup Decision Problem for 3 Primes): Same with the Assumption 1 of [8] .
Assumption 2 [10] : Given a group generation algorithm G, define the distribution as follows:
The advantage of an algorithm A in solving Assumption 2 is defined as
Definition 1: The Assumption 2 holds provided Adv A2
G,A is negligible on κ for all polynomial time algorithm A.
Assumption 3: Same with the Assumption 3 of [8] .
B. l-SDH ASSUMPTION
Assumption 4 (l-SDH Assumption) [9] , [14] : Suppose G is a bilinear group of prime order p and g is a generator of it. The l− Strong Diffie-Hellman (l−SDH) problem means that given a (l+1)-tuple g, g x , g x 2 , · · · , g x l , find a pair c, g 1 / (x+c) such that c ∈ Z p and g 1 / (x+c) ∈ G. We say that an algorithm A can break l−SDH with advantage provided
≥ over the random value x ∈ Z * p and the random bits expended by A. Definition 2: The (l, t, ) −SDH assumption holds in G if no t− time algorithm solves the l−SDH problem in G with advantage at least .
C. LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE
The ring signature is an important cryptography primitive. The feature of the ring signature is that an organization composed of multiple members can be regard as a ring, in which each ring member can sign on behalf of the whole ring (i.e., the organization) with his signature private key. On the other hand, a verifier can verify whether a ring signature comes from the organization, but the specific signer is anonymous to the verifier. The linkable ring signature adds linkability to the ring signature so that ring signatures from the same signer can be linked together. That is, we can judge whether any two ring signatures come from the same signer. The linkable ring signature is often used in anonymous electronic voting system to solve the problem of double counting. We adopt the linkable ring signature scheme of [22] in our scheme, now a brief review of it is presented as follows: 
3)
over the message M and the list of signature public keys L as follows:
Since the first term of σ is θ 1 , start from i = 1 and iteratively com-
If yes, accept. Otherwise, reject. Linkability: For the same list of signature public keys L, given two valid signatures associating with a fixed L, =ỹ . If they are equal, the two signatures are produced by the same signer. Otherwise, the two signatures are yielded by two distinct signers. We find that the relationship between the link flagỹ and the signer potentially provides a tracing method for the signer. (Note that the relationship is not public in [22] as the anonymity of the linkable ring signature.) The interesting property (i.e., linkability) will be used to achieve the traceability for users in our scheme.
III. DEFINITION A. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
The conventional white-box traceable ABE schemes mainly implement the single user-layer system ( Fig. 1) , in which the authority directly manages every individual user. Our scheme extends these traceable ABE schemes and constructs a two-layer system for the multi-domain environment (Fig. 2) . In the two-layer system, it takes domains as units and organizes users in each domain into a ring structure through the linkable ring signature [22] . Domains are managed by the authority and users are managed by their domain (domain manager). In Fig. 2 , we replace user attributes with domain attributes so that the users in the same domain can share the same domain attributes. In real applications, the number of domains is much smaller than the number of users. Hence, the two-layer system in Fig. 2 has better performance than the single user-layer system in Fig. 1 . In addition, we demand that there is no intersection between users in different domains, that is, the same user cannot belong to multiple domains at the same time.
B. NOTATION
As shown in Table 1 , We define the notations which are used in this paper. 
C. DEFINITION OF THE ALGORITHMS
The scheme consists of the following five algorithms: 
D. SECURITY MODEL
The following security model is defined as a security game between a challenger and an attacker. It is the indistinguishability game under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA game) [10] .
(1) Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and passes the public parameter pp to the attacker. Note that if the attacker is allowed decryption queries to the challenger in Phase 1 and Phase 2, the above model can be transformed into the one that resists chosen ciphertext attack [10] .
Definition 3: Our scheme is fully IND-CPA secure (i.e., satisfying indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack) if all polynomial time attackers win the above security game with at most negligible advantage.
E. TRACEABILITY MODEL
The following security game between a challenger and an attacker [10] is used to prove the traceability for domains of our scheme.
(1) Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and passes the public parameter pp to the attacker. (2) Key Query: The attacker queries the challenger for user private keys corresponding to (σ 1 , S 1 ), · · · , σ q , S q . (3) Key Forgery: The attacker yields a user private key SK * . We use an algorithm GTrace (pp, SK ) → gidor to represent the domain tracing. (The algorithm does not appear in the real scheme.) The attacker wins the game provided GTrace (pp, SK * ) = (i.e., SK * is well-formed) and GTrace (pp, SK * ) / ∈ gid 1 , · · · , gid q . The advantage of the attacker in winning the game is defined as
The traceability for domains of our scheme holds if all polynomial time attackers win the above traceability game with at most negligible advantage.
IV. OUR SCHEME
The details of our scheme are shown in this section, before that there are three matters needing attention as follows:
(1) Assume that the initialization of the linkable ring signature has been completed in advance, and users in each domain have been organized into a ring structure. (2) Assume that the authority knows the relationship between each domain (being organized into a ring) and its list of signature public keys (i.e., (L, gid)). 
and outputs the public parameter
and the master secret key
The domain tracing table AT is set to be Ø, and each user tracing table DT is initialized by its domain manager DA respectively. (2) Encrypt (pp, (A, ρ) , M ) → CT : The access structure of the scheme is expressed through the linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS). A is a × n matrix and ρ is a map from each row vector A i of A to an attribute ρ (i) ∈ U (i = 1, · · · , ). The restriction is that by ρ, distinct row vectors cannot be mapped to the same attribute. M ∈ G T is a message. The algorithm picks two random vectors
It produces the ciphertext as [22] , and returns L, M , σ to AA, where L is the list of signature public keys of Dn gid . 4) AA checks L, M , σ by using the signature verification algorithm of [22] and determines whether to accept the signature or not. Through the interaction, the authority can verify the validity of a user and obtain the identity of the domain to which the user belongs. If a user cannot pass the signature verification, the algorithm KeyGen will be interrupted. Note that the introduced linkable ring signature won't induced much costs for validation. The verification operations regarding signatures were executed by the authority rather than users, and these actions only occurred in the phase of key generation. Since the authority usually has powerful computing capability, the introduced signature scheme won't cause performance bottlenecks of the system.
Phase 2:
AA obtains gid from the relationship (L, gid), and then generates a domain private key GSK gid,S for Dn gid . Note that AA generates GSK gid,S only when a Dn gid 's user applies for a user private key for the first time, whereas when such applications happen again, AA only utilizes the existing results (as a domain has only one domain private key). This mechanism can avoid the repeated generation of the domain private key and reduce the workload of the authority.
and R x ← R G p 3 , ∀x ∈ S, and outputs the domain private key
Phase 3:
AA yields the user private key SK of user uid,gid based on GSK gid,S . (Since the user identity remains anonymous to the authority, the user private key has no subscript.) AA sets K =ỹ and computes K x = GK x ·ỹ t x = U (a+c)t x R xỹ t x , ∀x ∈ S, whereỹ is the link flag of σ . It outputs the user private key
Note that in practice, if only the parameters {t x } x∈U in msk are disclosed to domain managers, the operations of generating user private keys can be delegated to domain managers, which will further relieve the workload of the authority.
in CT cannot be satisfied by the domain attribute set S related to SK , the algorithm outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it evaluates constants {ω i ∈ Z N } such that
, and evaluates
Thus, M can be extracted through C · F/E. 
Remarks:
Our scheme adapts to the two-layer multidomain environment, meaning that the key generation and the tracing should be realized in two layers. From the above construction, we can see that the tracing is two-layer. For the key generation, it mainly shows how the authority generates both the domain private keys and the user private keys. This seems a one-layer key generation fashion. But in fact, we can easily transform it into a two-layer key generation by doing two modifications: 1) In the Setup algorithm, set the master secret key as msk = α, a, X 3 , {u x , t x } x∈U which was possessed by the authority. Set the secret key of the domain manager as dsk = {t x } x∈U , and each domain manager owns a copy of dsk. 2) In the Phase 2 of the KeyGen algorithm, the authority gives the domain private key GSK gid,S to the corresponding domain manager DA gid . And then in the Phase 3 of the KeyGen algorithm, the DA gid uses its GSK gid,S and dsk as well as the linkable flagỹ to generate the user private key SK and issues it to the corresponding user. With the two modifications, the key delegation from the authority to domain managers can further relieve the workload of the authority. It also can better reflect the two-layer construction of our scheme.
V. PROOF A. SECURITY OF THE SCHEME
The security of our scheme is reduced to that of the scheme of [8] by using the proof method of [10] . We refer to the scheme of [8] and our scheme as and respectively. The following is a brief review of . (For more details about the following parameters, we refer the reader to [8] or [10] .) (1) Setup (κ, U ) → (pp, msk) : The algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ and an attribute universe U , outputs the public parameter
and the master secret key msk = (α) .
(2) Encrypt (pp, (A, ρ) , M ) → CT . The algorithm takes as input the public parameter pp, an access structure (A, ρ), and a message M , outputs the ciphertext
.
(3) KeyGen (pp, msk, S) → SK : The algorithm takes as input the public parameter pp, the master secret key msk, and an attribute set S, outputs the decryption key
The algorithm takes as input the public parameter pp, a ciphertext CT , and a decryption key SK . If the attribute set S of SK satisfies the access structure (A, ρ) of CT , the algorithm computes
and then recovers M through C · e (g, g) βts /e (K , C 0 ) .
Lemma 1 [8]:
If Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then the scheme is fully IND-CPA secure.
Lemma 2: If the scheme is fully IND-CPA secure in the security game of [8] , then our scheme is fully IND-CPA secure in the security game of Section III.D.
Proof: Assume that A is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary which has advantage Adv A in breaking our scheme , a PPT simulator B which has advantage Adv B equaling Adv A in breaking the scheme can be established. For simplicity, suppose that the users A queries belong to different domains.
(1) Setup: provides the public parameter
. to B. B randomly picks a ← R Z N and t x ← R Z N , ∀x ∈ U , and then offers A the public parameter
It also assigns the domain tracing 
B randomly picks c ← R Z * N and calculates the inverse of (a + c) modulo N and writes it down as 1 (a + c). Implicitly, t =t (a + c) and GK = c are assigned. B leverages the generator X 3 of G p 3 to yield a random value R ∈ G p 3 , then computes the components of the domain private key
B gets gid from the relationship (L, gid), and then adds (c, gid) into AT . B obtains the link flagỹ from σ , and
R xỹ t x , ∀x ∈ S. B responds A with the user private key
(3) Challenge: A declares to B two equal length messages M 0 and M 1 as well as an access structure (A * , ρ). achieves ((A * , ρ) , M 0 , M 1 ) from B and returns to B the challenge ciphertext
. 
B chooses a random vector
η = (0, η 2 , · · · , η n ) ← R Z n N . For each row vector A i of A * , it evaluates the inner products δ i = A i η. And then for i = 1, · · · , , it calculates C i = h δ i C i t ρ(i) = h δ i T r i ρ(i) . A obtains from B the challenge ciphertext CT = (A * , ρ) , C =C, C 0 =C 0 , C 0 =C a 0 = g as , C i =C i , C i =C i , C i i=1 .(
B. TRACEABILITY
Our scheme supports the two-layer tracing, namely the domain tracing and the user tracing. The traceability for users can be proved by the unforgeability and linkability of the linkable ring signatures [22] . In this part, we mainly argue the traceability for domains by using the proof method of [10] .
Theorem 2: If the Assumption 2 and the l−SDH assumption hold, then our scheme has the traceability for domains when q < l (q is the key query times made by an adversary).
Proof: Assume that A is a PPT adversary which has a non-negligible advantage ε in winning the traceability game by making q key queries, a PPT simulator B which has a non-negligible advantage in solving the Assumption 2 or the l−SDH assumption can be established. For simplicity, suppose that the users A queries belong to different domains.
Challenger gives B two independent instances of the Assumption 2 and the l−SDH assumption respectively as follows:
(1) An instance of the Assumption 2: Let p 1 , p 2 , p 3 be three distinct primes, G and G T be cyclic groups of
T , the aim of B is to distinguish between T ∈ G and T ∈ G p 1 p 3 to break the Assumption 2.
(2) An instance of the l−SDH assumption: Let p 1 , p 2 , p 3 be three distinct primes, G and G T be cyclic groups of 
B achieves the public parameter
, and then gives it to A. B also sets AT = Ø. 
B computes the components of the domain private key
B gets gid i according to L i , and adds (c i , gid i ) into AT . B obtains the link flagỹ i from σ i , and computes
, ∀x ∈ S i . B gives A the user private key
(SK i denotes the i−th user private key requested by A.) (3) Key Forgery: A creates a user private key SK * to B. Note that in A's view, the distributions of N , G, G T , e, X 3 , {A i } l i=0 for no matter µ = 0 or µ = 1 are indistinguishable, and µ is unknown to A. The distributions of the public parameter and user private keys keep consistent with the real scheme.
E A stands for the event that A wins the above traceability game, that is, SK * meets all four key sanity checks of Section IV.A, and has a component K such that
(From the beginning of the proof, we have Pr [E A ] = ε.) Next, we discuss the assistance of E A for B to solve the Assumption 2 and the l−SDH assumption.
If E A arises, B makes a long division f (y) y + K , and obtains a quotient ϕ (y) = q−1 i=0 γ i y i as well as a remainder
N , and K / ∈ c 1 , · · · , c q , i.e., f (y) cannot be divided by y + K exactly). Therefore, f (y) can be written as f (y) = ϕ (y) y + K + γ −1 .Then B has either gcd (γ −1 , N ) = 1 or gcd (γ −1 , N ) = 1:
1 has no help for B to solve the Assumption 2 and the l−SDH assumption, we have (conditional probability)
Note that if B randomly guesses b ∈ {0, 1} for solving the Assumption 2, b = b occurs with probability 1 2. E SDH ĉ,ŵ denotes that ĉ,ŵ is a solution of the l−SDH assumption. If B randomly outputs ĉ,ŵ , E SDH ĉ,ŵ arises with a negligible probability, for simplicity, set 0.
has no help for B to solve the l−SDH assumption, we have
However, gcd (γ −1 , N ) = 1 can help B to solve the Assumption 2. As gcd
Same with the analysis of [10] , we conclude that
has no help for B to break the Assumption 2 and the l−SDH assumption, we have
Since gcd (γ −1 , N ) = 1 has no help for B to break the Assumption 2, we have
However, gcd (γ −1 , N ) = 1 can help B to break the l−SDH assumption. B can employ the following method to yield ĉ, 
As e ĝ a ·ĝˆc,ŵ = e ĝ a ·ĝ K ,ĝ 1 (a+K ) = e ĝ,ĝ , ĉ,ŵ is a solution of the l−SDH assumption. Hence, we have
Now we can evaluate the probabilities of B in breaking the Assumption 2 and the l−SDH assumption respectively by using the total probability formula. (Same with the derivation of [10] .) We just give the results: (* denotes the conditions about the values of gcd (γ −1 , N ) and µ.)
We further compute the advantages Adv B,A2 and Adv B,SDH of B in solving the Assumption 2 and the l−SDH assumption respectively:
Therefore, the advantage of B in solving the Assumption 2 VOLUME 7, 2019 and the l−SDH assumption is
From the Dirichlet's drawer principle, Adv B,A2 or Adv B,SDH is at least ≥ ε 8, that is, B has advantage ≥ ε 8 in solving the Assumption 2 or has advantage ≥ ε 8 in solving the l−SDH assumption.
VI. SCHEME ANALYSIS A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We measure the performance of our scheme with other related schemes from two aspects, the communication cost and the computation cost. The communication cost comparison with related schemes, including the public parameter size, the ciphertext size, and the user private key size, is summarized in Table 2 . The computation cost comparison with related schemes, including the operations during the encryption, the user private key generation, and the decryption, is evaluated in Table 3 . We give the concrete analysis in the following. From Table 2 , it is found that all items of Table 2 in [18] grow linearly with (U + l) as the scheme of [18] is against the subset derivation from the original user attribute set. This leads to its less efficiency than other schemes in Table 2 . It is observed that the schemes of [14] support large universe so that the public parameter size in them is constant. The public parameter size in [20] is also constant. The scheme of [17] supports large universe and multi-authority such that the public parameter size in it grows linearly with |U θ |. Other schemes in Table 2 are small universe schemes, where the public parameter size in our scheme is around 2l shorter than that in [18] and is second only to that in [10] . It is observed that the ciphertext size in [10] and [20] grows linearly with 2 , that the ciphertext size in our scheme and [14] grows linearly with 3 , and that the ciphertext size in [17] grows linearly with 6 . Thus, the ciphertext size in our scheme is the same as that in [14] , and is slightly larger than that in [10] and [20] , and is much smaller than that in [17] and [18] . In terms of the user private key size, our scheme, [10] , [14] , [20] and [17] are all linearly related to |S|. The user private key size in our scheme and [10] is about a half of that in [14] and [20] , and is about a quarter of that in [17] . Hence, our scheme and [10] have the best efficiency in the user private key size among the schemes in Table 2 .
In Table 3 , we evaluate the computation cost on three primary operations over group elements, namely the pairing operation, P, the exponentiation operation, E (in G) and E T (in G T ), and the multiplication operation, M (in G) and M T (in G T ). From Table 3 , it is shown that the encryption computation costs in our scheme and [14] rank at the middle level. In other words, they are slightly higher than that in [10] and [20] , but are much lower than that in [17] and [18] . Especially, the encryption computation cost in [18] is related to |U | which is a large quantity, and the encryption computation cost in [17] includes one P operation which consumes much time. These make them inefficiency in terms of the encryption. During the user private key generation, the computation cost in our scheme is mainly includes 2 |S| E operations and 2 |S| M operations. It is approximately twice as much as that in [10] and has |S| more M operations than that in [20] . However, it performs better than that in [14] , [18] and [17] . Therefore, the computation cost of the encryption and the user private key generation in our scheme is relatively reasonable. According to the decryption computation cost, the schemes in Table 3 can be sorted in ascending order as [10] , [20] , our scheme, [14] , [17] , and [18] . From the order, it is found that the decryption computation cost in our scheme locates lower levels, which means that a user in our scheme can achieve relatively fast decryption speed. (Actually, [20] adopts an outsourced decryption mechanism, so that the user need only do one M T operation during the decryption. However, in order to have an intuitive comparison, we present the detail operations during the decryption in [20] .)
Through considering all the comparison items of both Table 2 and Table 3 , it can conclude that the performance of our scheme, consisting of the communication cost and the computation cost, is acceptable and even has certain advantages. Table 4 shows the features of our scheme with other related schemes. Note that the security in Table 4 refers to the security proof of the scheme rather than the traceability proof of the scheme. From Table 4 , in terms of the expressiveness of the access policy, our scheme, [10] , [14] , and [17] all adopt the LSSS, supporting any monotone access structures. Reference [20] employs the access tree, which can realize the AND gate, the OR gate, and the threshold gate. The access structure of [18] only composes of a single AND gate. Therefore, our scheme is highly expressive on access policy. In terms of the security, the scheme of [20] is proved in the generic bilinear group model. (In fact, [20] did not give the security proof of its scheme, but since its scheme is similar as the scheme of [23] , we infer that they use the same security model, i.e., the generic bilinear group model.) And [17] uses the random oracle model. However, the security proof of our scheme and the schemes of [10] , [14] , and [18] are all based on the standard model. Our scheme and [10] are fully IND-CPA secure, whereas the schemes of [14] and [18] just achieve selective IND-CPA security. Hence, our scheme has certain advantages in the security.
B. FEATURE ANALYSIS
Additionally, from the Table 4 , we should not overlook the property that our scheme supports two-layer tracing for both domains and intradomain users. Nevertheless, none of the other schemes in Table 2 , 3, and 4 can do it. If these schemes (except our scheme) are adopted to realize the two-layer traceability, then their performance cost, including the communication cost and the computation cost, will be twice as much as that shown in Table 2 and 3 . Obviously, when reaching the same goal (i.e., the two-layer traceability), our scheme is more efficient than the other schemes in Table 2 , 3, and 4.
According to the comprehensive analysis, our scheme not only has the characteristic of two-layer tracing, but also has certain performance advantages and high security. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We give the implementations and evaluations of our scheme and the scheme of [10] in this part. Our scheme and the scheme of [10] are constructed in composite order groups, whereas the schemes of [14] , [20] , [18] , and [17] are constructed in prime order groups. Some studies have argued that the schemes established in composite order groups are slower than those established in prime order groups [24] , [25] . For instance, the time cost of a Tate pairing on a 1024-bit composite order elliptic curve is around 50 times larger than that of the same pairing on a prime order elliptic curve with the same security level [13] . Based on the principle of fairness, it is appropriate to compare only the implementations of our scheme and the scheme of [10] . We programmed the two schemes by using the Java pairing-based cryptography (JPBC) library [26] . A Type A1 pairing was chosen to realize the operations in composite order groups. The experiments were run on a Windows 10 system with an Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-7200U CPU at 2.50 GHz and 8.00 GB RAM. As shown in Fig. 3 , the evaluations mainly include the time costs (in milliseconds) of encryption, key generation (user private key generation), and decryption. In addition, as an intuitive evidence for theoretical analysis, our simulation experiment only considered the operations related to CP-ABE, such as the pairing, the exponentiation, and the multiplication (in group). Other operations, such as the linkable ring signature in our scheme, were not measured. Fig. 3 (a) , (b), and (c) illustrates the trends of time overhead of encryption, key generation, and decryption respectively as the number of attributes increases. (In fact, the performance of encryption, key generation, and decryption depends on the size of the access policy, , the number of attributes related to the user private key, |S|, and the number of attributes participating in decryption, |I |, respectively. Because , |S|, and |I | essentially represent the number of attributes, the abscissa axis labels in Fig. 3 are simply written as ''Number of attributes''.) In particular, the encrypted message in the experiment is not a plaintext file, but is simulated by a group element in G T . It is observed that encryption time cost both in our scheme and the scheme of [10] basically grows linearly with the number of attributes, as shown in Fig. 3 (a) . The experimental results of key generation and decryption are similar to that of encryption, as shown in Fig. 3 (b) and (c) . Thanks to the fact that our scheme achieves the two-layer traceability whereas the scheme of [10] only supports one single layer tracing, the growth rate of time cost in our scheme is larger than that in the scheme of [10] . When there are 20 attributes participating in our experiment, the time overhead of encryption, key generation, and decryption in our scheme increased to 54126 ms, 23315 ms, and 23495 ms respectively. It is found that the encryption cost is the largest, while the key generation cost and the decryption cost are moderate. In practice, encryption operations are not often executed (For example, the encrypted data stored in cloud remains unchanged for a period of time.), and key generation operations are performed by the authority who has powerful computing capability, so the decryption overhead occurred at user ends is the main factor determining the efficiency of the system. Therefore, the total time cost in our scheme is acceptable. In a word, the experimental results shown in Fig. 3 agree with the theoretical analysis shown in Table 3 .
Finally, we would like to emphasize that although our scheme (constructed in composite order groups) is slower than those schemes [14] , [17] , [18] , [20] proposed in prime order groups, it does not mean our scheme lacks competitive advantages compared with them. On the one hand, our scheme is proved fully IND-CPA secure by adapting the assumptions in composite order group and the dual system encryption technique [8] . However, the schemes of [14] and [18] are only proved selectively IND-CPA secure. Selective security is defined by imposing the attacker must declare the access structure before receiving the public parameter, whereas full security has no such restriction. Therefore, full security is more reasonable than selective security. On the other hand, according to the Table 3 , the asymptotic time complexity of our scheme is not worse than that of other schemes in Table 3 . It indicates that as the number of attributes increases, the growth trend of the computation cost of our scheme is acceptable. Unfortunately, the inefficiency of operations in composite order groups weakens the performance of our scheme when implemented. As far as we know, there have been some works focusing on transforming com-posite order schemes into prime order ones [24] , [27] , [28] . We think they can provide us with some guidance to improve the performance of our scheme in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In order to address the problem of malicious user tracing in multi-domain environment, a CP-ABE scheme that supports both white-box tracing for domains and intradomain users is proposed in this paper. In the scheme, with the leaked user private key, it first uses the tracing method of [10] to determine the domain from which the user private key comes, and then uses the link flag of the linkable ring signature of [22] to identify the malicious user in the domain. The domain tracing is carried out by the authority, and the user tracing in a domain is carried out by the domain's manager. The two-layer tracing relieves the workload of a single authority and improves the performance of the system. Meanwhile, the domain attributes are used instead of the user attributes in this paper. It reduces the scale of attributes in the system and further improves the performance. At present, we mainly construct and simulate our two-layer traceable CP-ABE scheme in theory.
In the future, we will focus on and enhance the practicality of our scheme when it is deployed in a real multi-domain environment where a high number of users, large files, and various policies are involved. Moreover, as far as we know, the black-box traceability is a stronger concept than whitebox one, and its implementation is more difficult [10] . In the future, we will consider constructing black-box traceable ABE schemes in multi-domain environment to provide more abundant solutions for the problem of malicious user tracing in multi-domain environment. 
